Russia’s War on Ukraine: A Structural Realist Perspective on the Changing European Security – Büşra Bayramoğlu

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It has been eight months since Russia’s
war on Ukraine. In its new strategic concept, NATO defined Russia as ‘the most
significant and direct threat’ and decided to increase the number of its
troops from 40,000 to 300,000 along its eastern flank. Germany raised its defense
spending above 2 percent of its GDP. The European Union (EU) announced granting
candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova. Moreover, Finland and Sweden are
preparing to become new members of NATO.  All of these developments have been triggered
by the current aggressive policy of Russia in Ukraine. So, how did Russia get
to the point? And why did not Russia’s previous military interventions, in Georgia
in 2008 and in Crimea in 2014, give this motivation to the West?

Russian
intervention: From Georgia to Crimea

The
recognition of the independence of Kosovo (under UNSCR 1244) by the US and the majority
of EU member states, and NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Summit, where the alliance
promised that Ukraine and Georgia would someday become members of NATO, have
been important catalyzing events for Russia’s military intervention in Georgia
in 2008. One year later, although the reset policy between the US and Russia
focused on arms control, and cooperation in Iran and Afghanistan, disagreements
over the European and post-Soviet region security continued. Consequently, emergent
conflicts in eastern Ukraine and the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 caused a serious deterioration of
relations between Russia and the West. Yet, the annexation of Crimea by Russia in
2014 also marked the first territory seizure since the end of the
Second World War.
 As a result of the diplomatic efforts of
France and Germany primarily, the Minsk Protocol was signed on 5 September 2014, aimed at ending the existing
conflicts and finding a political solution in eastern Ukraine. It, however, failed
to resolve the conflicts because it offered the special status of districts of
Donetsk and Luhansk oblast. Thus, contrary to these diplomatic efforts, the EU, and the US have responded to these
moves of Russia by imposing economic sanctions on Russian companies and
oligarchs beginning from 2014 until today. Despite all of these economic
sanctions, Russia initiated another military intervention in Syria on behalf of
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in 2015 and on February 24, 2022, launched a military
operation against Ukraine.

Russia started
to build up military forces closer to its Ukraine border for training purposes during
the spring of 2021 and increased the number of its military personnel over 90.000
in western Russia during the 2021 autumn. On 1 December, the US Secretary of State
Antony Blinken during his visit to Europe warned that ‘if Russia invades
Ukraine, Washington will be prepared to act’. A few days later, the Washington
Post published an unclassified US intelligence document, which warns that the
number of Russian forces has been extremely increasing near the Ukrainian border. Meanwhile, Russia insisted to
demand a legally binding security guarantee that Ukraine will not join NATO sooner
or later in the future. On 17 December, the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs published unilaterally a draft of an agreement
titled ‘Agreement on measures to ensure the security of Russia and member
states of the NATO’, which states that ‘the parties should not conduct any
military activity on the territory of Ukraine as well as other states in
Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia’.  However, NATO rejected the Russian demand and
emphasized that all states have a right to decide on their own futures. From
November 2021 to February 2022, Russia’s
military buildup near the Ukrainian border did not come to an end. On 21
February, Russia declared the independence of the Republics of Donets and
Luhansk and announced its withdrawal from the Minsk Protocol. On 24 February, it
launched a “special military operation” with the purpose of denazification and
demilitarization of Ukraine.

Russia and
Changing Balance of Power in Europe

From a neorealist perspective, one can argue
that the relative decline of the West’s actual power allowed for Russia’s aggressive
policy. Consequent military interventions of Russia in Georgia, Crimea, and
Syria occurred at a time when there were different voices in NATO, the US, and EU member states. Moreover,
the Trump administration deepened that crack by serving Russia’s foreign policy
interests. Today, while the West has imposed economic
sanctions against Russia, some European states, like Germany and Italy, have problems
finding alternative energy routes. They are still the largest European consumers
of Russian gas and are likely to face higher prices over the upcoming winter. Moreover,
the emerging crises of runaway rate of inflation and costs-of-living in several
European states, and a possible Trump comeback in the US, are expected to erode
the support for Ukraine in the West.

The
Ukraine war has led to a change in the balance of power on the European
continent. It has brought up the issue of
Europe’s security again. Against whom will this security be provided and who
will provide it? For now, Russia has played the role of an international scapegoat,
but it does not mean that Russia will not become a ‘European’ again. At
the Munich Security Conference, a week before the Russian military intervention,
German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz was asked ‘whether Russia will be identified closer
to China if it invades Ukraine?’. Scholz’s answer was that ‘there are also
disagreements between Russia and China’. Eventually, Russia does not seek to
create an alternative international system, but provides the consistent
application of the balance of power that was established after the end of the Second
World War. A potential conflict between China and Russia in Siberia or Central
Asia is likely to make Russia a European stakeholder in the international
system again.

Although
personal and ideological explanations about Russia- Ukraine war are not wrong. However, I argue that structural
realism can provide more explanatory arguments. Beyond Russian President
Vladimir Putin’s psychological breakdown,
the reason why Russia invaded Ukraine, the global reactions to the war, and the current
situation have led us to think about the international power structures. Kenneth
N. Waltz, in his work, Theory of International Politics (1979), claimed
that the structure of a system changes with changes
in the distribution of capabilities across the system’s units, that is the
states, and changes in the structure also change how the states will behave. As
the structure influences states’ behavior, the system will tend to restore a
disrupted balance of power. Thus, I argue that the invasion of Ukraine has accelerated
changes in the distribution of capabilities across the states, particularly in
Europe.

Make Europe Balanced
Again

We live in a world where
the 1990’s era of liberal victory has faded due to the 2008 financial crisis,
the Trump administration in the U.S., the Covid-19 pandemic,
and lastly Russia’s war on Ukraine. This international structure, which is
anarchic, nuclear, and multipolar forces states to look to their own resources
to ensure their security. The quest for rearmament and energy independence in
Europe against Russia has reminded us that it will continue to do so. During Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine, we’ve also seen that the aim of Ukraine’s demilitarization,
for Russia, has shifted to Ukraine’s territorial gains. The war has as another
reminder of the importance of spheres of influence among the great powers, although
the mutual destruction in the nuclear age constrains the great power war. Thus,
as seen in Europe, the change in the distribution of power may continue to show
its reflection in different regions, such as Central Asia. Since
different states tend to act in similar power positions, the distribution of power in Europe is likely
to be balanced with the rise of China.

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To cite this work: Büşra Bayramoğlu, “Russia’s War on Ukraine: A Structural Realist Perspective on the Changing European Security”, Panorama, Online, 28 November 2022, https://www.uikpanorama.com/blog/2022/11/28/bb/

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