Energy and the Potential for Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean – Mitat Çelikpala

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The sanctions imposed by Western actors
in response to Russia’s annexation and occupation of part of Ukrainian territory
have moved up energy security in the global agenda. The general expectation
after the referendums aimed at legitimizing the annexation of eastern Ukraine
into Russia is that the tension will last long and include the possibility of nuclear war. This situation, combined
with using the energy card as a weapon by Russia, Europe’s largest energy
supplier, has brought the topics of returning to alternative energy sources and
energy diversification into the debate again.

While European actors prioritize accelerating the
transition to renewable energy sources, turning to alternative energy/natural
gas sources is also one of the goals. In this context, the supply of more
liquefied natural gas (LNG) from providers such as the US and Norway, bringing
Caspian and Central Asian gas to the agenda, and the tightening of relations
with North African partners such as Libya and Algeria were the first
alternatives that came to mind. Data from the International Energy Agency indicates that Europe’s LNG imports will increase by 60 billion cubic
meters this year. Another possible source that draws attention to this equation
and closely concerns Turkey is the Eastern Mediterranean.

Does Eastern Mediterranean Gas Flow to the European Market?

With the agreement signed between the
EU, Egypt, and Israel on 17 June 2022, it was agreed to deliver
Egyptian and Israeli gas to the European market as LNG through Egypt. This agreement also envisaged renewable energy, the
use of hydrogen, increasing energy efficiency, and developing electricity
networks throughout the Mediterranean. The deal means a new and different dimension after the
EU and the US withdrew their support in 2021 from constructing the Eastern
Mediterranean Pipeline, considered the region’s most strategic project, due to
technical and commercial limitations. While this
step opens up a new perspective on Europe’s energy security, the fact that it
is moving away from Ankara’s energy, foreign, and security discourses and
policies is also apparent.

The story began in the mid-2000s with
the discovery of natural gas deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ankara
considered it a development compatible with common interests that would
initially serve Turkey and Europe’s energy security and diversity. It was
thought that the transportation of Eastern Mediterranean resources through
Turkey to the European markets would contribute to meeting Turkey’s needs and
turn Turkey into a kind of regional energy hub. This line, alongside supporting
Northern Iraqi and Azerbaijani resources, was significant for ensuring
diversity. However, it was rapidly reversed due to the developments in Syria
under the influence of the deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations and the
general tension created by the Arab uprisings in the region. While the cold
weather in Ankara’s relations with the EU and the US has turned Turkey’s EU
adventure in the opposite direction, the increasing tension with Greece and the
lack of a solution to the Cyprus problem have turned the Eastern Mediterranean
from an issue of regional cooperation for Ankara into a clear competition
arena.

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) agreements
were signed between the relevant countries after the discovery of Egypt of the 850 billion cubic meters of Zohr deposits in 2015 -added to the already
found deposits off the coast of Cyprus and Israel- leaving Ankara out. This development moved the issue into the area of
sharing maritime jurisdiction. Moreover, initiatives such as the Eastern
Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), which marginalized Ankara by excluding it, also
brought the competition to the strategic level. This initiative was created in
January 2019 with the participation of Greece, the Greek Cypriot
Administration, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and Palestine, hosted by Egypt. The
Forum was an essential step in the context of regional actors such as Israel,
Jordan, and even Palestine, which had not previously established relations with
the Greek Cypriot Administration by considering their relations with Turkey,
thus opening new channels of cooperation without Turkey, even despite Turkey.

The concrete results of the
collaboration within the framework of the Forum, which took place without
Turkey, began to emerge in approximately three years. The momentum created by
this step, which can also be seen as the depth of the isolation of Turkey, led
to the establishment of military and security cooperation platforms between the
countries mentioned above. This became the latest stage of a process in which
Turkey is isolated and regional balances are shaped contrary to Turkey’s
expectations with the developments in the Middle East, mainly focused on Syria.

While Egypt’s transformation into a net
natural gas exporter since 2018 and the start of supplying gas to Israel will
shift the focus in the Eastern Mediterranean equation to Cairo. The Eastern
Mediterranean gas will probably enter the European market as LNG through Egypt
from the winter of 2022. Meanwhile, the biggest customer of Egyptian LNG from
the last quarter of 2021 was Ankara. This alone is enough to
fundamentally question Ankara’s Eastern
Mediterranean-oriented energy and
security policies of the previous ten years, which
aimed to become an energy hub in its region. The possibility of Eastern
Mediterranean gas flowing into international markets as a result of new
agreements, leaving out Turkey, the most significant consumer and importer in
the region, will mean that one of the
essential pillars of the policy of becoming a regional energy hub will be lost.

Understanding Ankara’s Agenda

Ankara has used different means of
foreign policy, including military dimension and escalation, to overcome the
regional exclusion it faced during this period. First, it increased its
visibility in Libya and signed maritime jurisdiction delimitation and
cooperation agreements with that country. Despite the reactions of Greece and
France, joint oil and gas exploration activities have been undertaken off the
coast of Libya. Finally, a memorandum of understanding
was signed on 3 October 2022, stipulating cooperation between the countries in
petroleum energy and hydrocarbons.

In the same period, Turkey’s
infrastructure was developed in the Mediterranean to enable energy exploration
by scanning and mapping marine areas. As of 2017,
four drilling vessels named Fatih, Yavuz, Kanuni, and Abdülhamid Han have been
added to the seismic research vessels called Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa and MTA Oruç Reis, which were introduced into the system in 2012 and
2017. Thus, an exploration and
drilling fleet has been created. Following this, intensive seismic dredging
and drilling activity was undertaken in the maritime areas of Turkey in the Black Sea and
the Mediterranean.

This mobility, which we can consider
Turkey’s attempt to change the balance and open a new area for itself in the
game, has clarified itself with the approach of exercising legal rights in the
sea areas defined as Blue Homeland (Mavi
Vatan) since 2006. In response to the Eastern Mediterranean Energy Forum
and other military cooperation initiatives that exclude Turkey, Turkey’s letter to the UN on 18 March 2019, which
defined the borders of its maritime areas as the country with the longest
coastal line in the Eastern Mediterranean, and made it clear that it would
protect this with the naval forces it sent to the region, was evaluated as
preferring coercive diplomacy in the Mediterranean balances.

Despite all these steps, the process has
not progressed in line with Ankara’s expectations. Its exclusion from regional
structures such as the Energy Forum continues, and it has not been able to
convince its regional/global interlocutors about the legitimacy of the approach
it follows. In this environment, steps are being taken to open a new page in
foreign policy. It is unclear whether these steps will meet expectations or
produce results. Although the stage of mutually appointing an ambassador
to Israel has been reached, concrete gains have not yet been achieved in other
areas. Relations with Egypt are uncertain. While
the tension with Greece extended to the Aegean with an atmosphere of elections
on both sides, the US signed additional agreements with Greece to increase its
military activity in this country and lifted the arms embargo that has been
active since 1987 against the Greek Cypriot
Administration. While these caused
significant discomfort in Ankara, they also indicate that Turkey’s isolation in the region is not decreasing
but, on the contrary, increasing. Turkey’s continued tensions with the EU and
some member states also presage a situation that increases despair.

Is a Return to Collaborative Relationships Possible?

It is possible to say that the Eastern Mediterranean
is no longer a problem that concerns only the Mediterranean region but has
turned into a ‘new’ area of global competition that draws in the US and the EU.
In this context, Turkey is seen as an uncompromising and coercive actor, while
it continues to be an influential game-changer. This role needs to be
transformed into a constructive actor to get quick results. Otherwise, Turkey’s
regional exclusion will become increasingly standardized and settled.

Despite all kinds of contradictions, the
priority should be to re-promote cooperation by creating areas of common
interest between Ankara and other regional actors through negotiations. In the
current circumstances, this is the sole remedy. Beyond the tension Turkey is experiencing with the regional countries over
the sharing of maritime areas, the economic and trade relations it has
established/will establish, especially in the region, can turn the process from
competition to cooperation. Discourses and policies emphasizing common
interests regarding energy needs and diversification may also address regional
relations constructively.

Considering that the tension with Russia in the north
cannot be resolved in the short term and tensions continue to exist between the
allies in different areas, the meaninglessness of spending energy on the
competition can be explained more understandably. In this context, the EU and
the US, too, must adopt an attitude that prioritizes cooperation rather than
encouraging tensions between Ankara and Athens. It is a must for regional
stability and security that they move away from the appearance of provoking
Turkey and taking a side against Ankara, which should encourage the parties to
find a solution through negotiations, avoiding conflict. Without this, the
results of Turkey’s unilateral efforts will be limited.

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To cite this work: Mitat Çelikpala, “”Energy and the Potential for Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean”, Panorama, Online, 17 December 2022, https://www.uikpanorama.com/blog/2022/12/17/mc/

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