Türkiye and the Changing World Order – Mehmet Ali Tuğtan

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To discuss Türkiye’s place in the changing world
order, one should clarify the term ‘world order.’ We call the body of
institutions and rules devised by the victors of the Second World War and have
been evolving since as the ‘World Order’. This order rests on three pillars:

i)
The distribution of capabilities in the neo-realist sense (Or the structure of
the international system);

ii)
The architecture of international institutions formed around the United Nations
(UN); and

iii)
The international political economy structure formed around Bretton Woods
institutions and rules.

The momentous developments witnessed in the ongoing
Russia-Ukraine War show that this structure has completed its useful lifespan
and is bound for change. Since an inquiry into the reasons and historical
process of this change would require a narrative too lengthy for the scope of
this article, here the existence of change will be treated as given, and the
estimated trajectory of change in the international order and Türkiye’s place
in this process will be discussed.

As a background for this discussion, one should note
the following:

The early post-Cold War era was a period when the
unipolar hegemony of the US emerged and dominated the other great powers in
terms of capability distribution. In this period, the US and its allies could institute
and implement the rules-based international system, resting on the three pillars
mentioned above, without much resistance. As a result, the military
interventions from the Gulf War to Bosnia were implemented with the legitimacy
provided by the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, and the Bretton Woods
institutions embraced neoliberal globalization in the world economy within the
framework of the Washington Consensus.

However, this US hegemony over the international
system plunged into crisis with the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the US
invasion of Iraq in 2003. The mishandling of Afghanistan and Iraq occupations
under the banner of the “International War on Terror” has seriously reduced the
ability of the United States to extend its political and economic model to the
rest of the world through voluntary adoption. The reputation of the US as a
benign hegemon, which had been the most critical feature of the unipolar moment
of the 1990s, has been largely tarnished by developments after 2001.

Further, the 2008 financial crisis that accompanied
this hegemonic crisis and the Great Recession it triggered reduced the ability
of the US and its allies to impose governance over the world economy and
clearly showed the harmful consequences of neoliberal deregulation, which
constituted the basic infrastructure of globalization.

Another contribution of the Great Recession to the
deepening crisis of hegemony was the defense spending cuts necessitated by
government interventions to alleviate the recession. Because of this, the US
significantly reduced the number of its troops and the scope of its military
operations in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, where it owed its ongoing
influence primarily to its permanent military presence and the military and
economic support it provided to its local allies. As a result, during the Arab
Spring, the US consented to overthrow pro-American autocratic regimes through
the widespread opposition movements, which were more critical of the US rather
than propping them up. The US also declared that she would be willing to work
with the governments formed by these popular movements if they abide by specific
criteria.

In parallel, where popular forces failed to overthrow
anti-American autocratic regimes, the US and its allies shied from converting
their military capabilities into power to support the overthrow of these
regimes -even though from Libya to Syria, they increasingly faced the direct
interventions of the Sino-Russian Axis and its local allies. This
counterbalancing trend started in 2007 and was not limited to the Middle East:
from Eastern Europe to Southeast Asia, the Sino-Russian axis (i.e., the “Eurasian
Bloc”) and its local allies engaged in balancing acts against the US-Europe
axis (the “Trans-Atlantic bloc”) and its regional allies. This new situation,
in which the relative power differences between the US and other great powers have
decreased in the international system, is conceptualized by experts as “loose
multipolarity” or “Cold War 2.0”.

We can talk about three basic characteristics of
Türkiye that determine its position in this changing international environment:

i)
Türkiye is a middle power in the neorealist sense, occupying a critical
geostrategic location at the intersection of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East;

ii)
Türkiye is a country that has had unique relations with Russia since the
establishment of the republic; and

iii)
Türkiye is a NATO member and a candidate state with a customs union with the EU
and has engaged in institutional military and political partnership with the US
and the EU for more than 70 years.

These three characteristics pose many risks and
opportunities for Türkiye in the current international conjecture. To
elaborate:

As a middle power with high geostrategic rent, Türkiye
has found an expanding room for maneuvering in this loose multipolar
environment during the last 20 years. Türkiye has cooperated with Russia, especially
after 2016, to benefit from this room of maneuver and gain more regional
autonomy in its relations with the US and the EU. But as it jockeyed for a
better position between the rival Trans-Atlantic and Eurasian blocs, Türkiye
has also been mindful of its institutional belonging and fundamental
commitments to the Trans-Atlantic bloc, the source of its primary collective
defense guarantees. Thus, Türkiye has actively participated in local power
struggles in vast geography from Syria to Libya, from Azerbaijan to Somalia, in
line with its interests, increasing its effectiveness in the Middle East, the
Mediterranean, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. In this process, Türkiye
developed intricate relations with the great powers and their local allies
involved in the same struggles and managed not to engage in direct conflict
with any great power -despite occasional close calls, to which the crisis after
the downing of a Russian warplane on the Syrian border in 2015 was the most
probable example. Still, the conflict was avoided there as well. On the other
hand, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War constitutes the zenith of this middle
power politics regarding the risks and opportunities it poses.

The Russia-Ukraine War is important for Türkiye for
two reasons: first, among the crises so far, this war is the biggest challenge
Türkiye has faced in maintaining its ongoing special relationship with Russia
in tandem with its membership in the Western bloc. Secondly, this war marks the
moment of disintegration of the post-World War II world order that has been in
trouble since 2003. Aware that this order can no longer be restored, Türkiye
should nevertheless act in a way that preserves its institutional gains (such
as collective defense guarantees) arising from this order, especially in the
short and medium term. In this context, the noticeable positive results of Türkiye’s
maintenance of open communication channels with Russia have been visible since
the first days of the war. On the other hand, Türkiye should continue to approach
the Russia-Ukraine War without deviating from the general policy line of NATO
since its collective defense guarantees, by and large, arise from its
institutional membership in the Western alliance. These guarantees would be
more critical against hot regional conflicts increasing in number and intensity
as the world order continues to dissolve.

Türkiye’s current line can be pursued so long as the
Russia-Ukraine war retains its present local and conventional character.
However, in the event of escalation (either by the involvement of NATO allies
or an escalation to the nuclear phase), Türkiye will/should make its choices in
line with its Western bloc identity.

This brings us to the last point: Türkiye’s
historical, deep-rooted, and institutional relations with the US and the EU.
The first question that needs to be answered in the medium term is the
direction of Türkiye’s domestic political preferences: rather than being a
transactional partner, if Türkiye wants to be an ally in the Western bloc
within the framework of shared political values (as was the case during the
Cold War), then compliance with the internationally accepted rules of
democracy, pluralism and market economy are the prerequisites for such an
alliance. Another condition is the willingness to resolve bilateral disputes
through international law and within the institutional frameworks of the
Western bloc. Of course, this does not mean that Türkiye should ignore its
cultural values and national interests. Still, it would be increasingly
difficult for a country whose general orientation points to Shanghai rather
than Brussels to stay in the Western bloc.

The second important question that needs to be
answered is whether Türkiye’s bloc membership will be handled with the
importance it deserves by its Western counterparts. Because ultimately, an alliance
is only possible between two willing and able parties. Suppose the US and EU
exclude Türkiye (whose critical importance for them in more than one region due
to its geostrategic location and capabilities is obvious) from the
institutional processes and guarantees of the Western bloc out of domestic
political considerations. In that case, Türkiye will have to find its place in
a new world order yet to be established. In this framework, a significant part
of the choices that will determine Türkiye’s place in the ‘new’ world order, in
the long run, will be made by Türkiye and the West.

As we approach the 100th anniversary of the republic,
Türkiye is at a turning point in a turbulent international environment. For
middle powers like Türkiye, such turning points involve great opportunities and
risks. Suppose both Türkiye and its interlocutors make prudent choices. In that
case, Türkiye can quickly achieve a politically pluralistic and democratic
structure and grow sustainably economically by transcending the middle-income
trap and inefficiency. Otherwise, a picture may emerge for Türkiye in which
politics is increasingly arbitrary and authoritarian, and the economy suffers
from ever-increasing inefficiency and income inequality.

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To cite this work: Mehmet Ali Tuğtan, ” Türkiye and the Changing World Order”, Panorama, Online, 23 December 2022, https://www.uikpanorama.com/blog/2022/12/23/mat/

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