Iran and the Iraqi Shiites: A Cyclical Relationship – Mehmet Bardakçı

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Introduction

Iran not only has religious objectives
in Iraq but also geopolitical interests. Iran seeks to export the Iranian
revolution to Iraq. At the same time, Iraq provides Iran geopolitical
advantages that help increase Tehran’s regional clout. After the overthrow of Saddam
Hussein by the US in 2003, the influence of Iran in Iraq has increased
dramatically. However, recently, Iran has lost its popularity even among the
Shia communities in Iraq, who prefer an independent Iraq and oppose Iranian
involvement in Iraqi internal affairs. The objective of this piece is to
demonstrate the changing Iraqi perceptions of the Iranian presence in Iraq and
the main aspects of this change. Iraqis’ attitudes towards the Iranian policies
in their territory are important since they determine the weight of Iran in
Iraqi politics. This, in turn, has a significant influence on Iran’s role in
its neighborhood.

Iranian
Interests in Iraq

Since the
US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran has been supporting the Shia communities,
viewing them as a counterbalance against the domination of the Iraqi state by
pan-Arab or nationalist segments of the Iraqi population. Iran’s interest in
Iraq originates not only from Tehran’s desire to serve its own interests and
keep Iraq weak but also from the religious philosophy of guardianship of
the Islamic jurist (vilayat-e
faqih), which
aims to spread the Islamic revolution to other Shia countries, including Iraq.
According to this concept, the Supreme Leader of Iran is the representative of
the 12^th Imam for the whole Shia population (i.e., in the world).
This means that Qom, the Supreme Leader’s religious center in Iran, is regarded
as the supreme authority for the entire Shia. Thus, Qom challenges the Shia
religious stronghold in Najaf, Iraq.

Iran also has geopolitical interests
in Iraq, which provides a connection land to its partners in Lebanon and Syria.
This strategic asset has become all the more important since the outbreak of
the Syrian conflict in 2011 and the threat by ISIS since 2014. Iran has further
interests insofar as the USA and its Western allies no longer have a major influence
in Iraq, and Tehran also wants to reduce the influence there of regional
powerhouses Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Additionally, Iraq provides a sizeable market
for Iranian goods and services, including power and gas
supplies.

Changing Iraqi Perceptions about the Iranian
Involvement in Iraq

Iran had hoped that its Shia political system, as the first model of governance in the Shia world, would serve as an example for other Shia communities, including Iraq. However, despite the dominance of the Shia community in the rule of Iraq after 2003, the Iraqis have not chosen an Islamic political system based on the Iranian model. The non-religious model of governance in Iraq even poses an existential threat to the Iranian political system.

Many Iraqi Shiites have developed a negative opinion of Iran’s involvement in Iraq, and in recent years, Iran has lost its capacity to serve as an example for Shia political Islam there. The latest public opinion polls in Iraq demonstrate that more than 85 percent of Iraqis and 82 percent of the Shia take a negative view of Iran’s role in their country (chart 1). Similarly, the Iraqis who believe that Iran is a reliable ally number just 18 percent overall and 23 percent of the Shia population (chart 2). Following the rise of ISIS in 2014, Iranians aided Baghdad in fending off the jihadist assaults, bolstering a positive Iranian image in Iraq, and Iran-affiliated armed groups have been fighting against ISIS within the framework of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). After 2020, however, internal disagreements within the PMF led to a splitting off of some PMF brigades, curtailing Iran’s struggles to keep the Iraqi Shiite groups united. Thus, while a public opinion survey in 2017 found that almost 70 percent of Iraqis viewed Iran positively, the same public opinion poll in 2020 found Iran’s popularity to have declined dramatically, to 15 percent. Even though some Iranian officials acknowledge that Iran has lost some of its soft power in Iraq because of its attempts to export the revolution there, the revolutionary segments of the Iranian state insist on hardline policies in Iraq, as well as regionally.

Iran has tense relations with some Shia communities in Iraq. Influential Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who espouses Iraqi
nationalism, dislikes Iranian influence in Iraq. Al-Sadr supports an
independent Iraq under the banner of “neither Eastern nor Western” involvement
in Iraq, which equates to “neither Iran nor the USA” and favors an Iraq that is
militarily independent of Iran.

An important point of contention between the Iran-backed Shia communities
and al-Sadr is that the latter wishes to develop Iraq’s relations with the Arab
states, including Saudi Arabia, which competes with Iran for influence in the
region. After the
US-led occupation of Iraq in 2003, Sadrist forces, with the support of Iran, were
one of the most active groups that fought US troops. During the past decade, however,
al-Sadr has changed course and become a nationalist figure. Since the
assassination of Iranian Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani in 2020,
al-Sadr has increased his criticism of Iran. The main reason for this change
could be to echo the wish for less Iranian influence in the country among
Iraqis, who generally want to see a stronger and more independent government. Similarly,
former Shiite Iraqi Prime Minister and Secretary General of the Shiite Dawa
Party Nouri al-Maliki was critical of Iranian activities in Iraq, stating
that “opposition to the US–Israeli–Saudi axis does not permit Iran to interfere
in Iraq.” Another influential Iraqi cleric not on good terms with the Iranian
leadership is Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Al-Sistani is at loggerheads with
Iran’s top cleric Ali Khamenei over the composition of the PMF in particular.

The launch of the
“maximum pressure” campaign against Iran by the Trump Administration in 2018
increased the possibility of turning Iraq into a battleground between
Washington and Tehran, raising concerns in Iraq. Moreover, the rise of illegal
and extrajudicial activities by some Shia communities allied with Iran has
raised question marks about the Iranian influence in Iraq. The failure of the Iran-supported government in Iraq to rule the
country dealt another blow to Iranian influence there, inducing Iraqi
protesters demanding a reduction in Iranian influence to attack its consulates
in Karbala and Najaf in 2019.

Conclusion

In short, Iranian
influence in Iraq has had its ups and downs, but it has recently been declining
due to the fact that Iraqis as a whole want their country to take an
independent course. Even the Shia community in Iraq objects to the Iranian
involvement in Iraqi internal affairs. Over the years, pro-Iranian groups in
Iraq have changed their positions towards Iran’s presence in their country. An
important Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr adopted Iraqi nationalism, parting his ways
with Iran. By the same token, former Shiite Iraqi Prime Minister and Secretary General of the Shiite
Dawa Party Nouri al-Maliki disliked Iranian policies in Iraq. Another
influential Iraqi cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has not been on the
same page over the composition of the PMF.

It goes without
saying that waning Iranian sway poses a threat to its objective to contain the
American influence in Iraq and to use the Iraqi land corridor to link to its
proxies in Syria and Lebanon. Potentially, a diminished Iranian involvement in
Iraq could also limit its room for maneuver in the competition with its
regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Turkey. This, in turn, would limit Iranian
influence in the region.

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To cite this work: Mehmet Bardakçı, “Iran and the Iraqi Shiites: A Cyclical Relationship”, Panorama, Online, 23 February 2023, https://www.uikpanorama.com/blog/2023/02/23/mb/

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