US-Turkey Relations in The Context of Syria: Crossroads for New Bilateral and Regional Alignments – Derya Göçer

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Tunisian uprising in late 2010
inspired different segments across the Middle East to have bolder demands for
change. The change in focus was broadly conceived, ranging from political
change, change of leaders and regimes to social and economic changes. Despite
the varying political and historical dynamics in the region, this demand for
change resonated and contributed to the protests in other countries, including
Syria. Starting with children’s protest and subsequent repression in Daar’a,
Syria’s Assad regime faced increasingly vocal and later armed opposition.
Syrian regime in the late 2000s was on the cusp of domestic restructuring of
its economy. Traditional Syrian alignment in the Middle East included support
from Iran. New alignments included increasing cooperation with Turkey,
especially during Davutoğlu’s time as Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Labelled as ‘zero problems with neighbors’ policy, Davutoğlu had emphasized the
economic and social benefits of being closer to Syria, all under the narrative
of former Ottoman unity in these lands. These new economic and social links
translated increasingly to political affinity. The end of US predominance in
global affairs had affected Turkey’s sense of increased maneuvering space and
Syria presented an opportunity to try out that maneuvering capacity. So, in
2011 Turkey attempted to play the role of the peace maker in Syrian affairs as
well as in the larger Middle East.

            That role has failed as Assad regime turned to more violent repression of the opposition and as the opposition turned outwards to foreign powers for support. Syrian uprising turned to Syrian civil war. The general Arab uprising transformations in the region also quickly turned against Turkey’s positioning. Turkey found itself with a desire for increased autonomy in global and regional affairs, yet a not-so-friendly region. In Syria, Turkey threw its weight against Assad regime and supported the opposition groups in various ways. This did not affect US-Turkey bilateral relationships that intensely at that time. The rise of ISIS and US interest in fighting ISIS while at the same time sending minimal military support culminated in US support to YPG. Turkey raised its objections to this support in several and very clear ways but did not reach a tangible result. There was a new proactive stance of Turkey in late 2000s, early 2010s which can be considered as a rupture from the foreign policy of 1980s and 1990s. However the objection to its allies’ building bridges with YPG could be counted as the continuation of earlier Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, from 1990s. Turkey counts PKK, the armed group, as a continuous national security threat. That has been a constant theme in Turkey’s bilateral and regional relations. Turkey also considers YPG to be organically linked to PKK.

            US-Turkish
tensions on the topic only deepened after 2015/6. 2015 was the year of Russia’s
entrance to the Syrian civil war and 2016 was the year of the failed coup
attempt in Turkey. While Russia’s entrance showcased how increased
multipolarity at the global level was experienced in the region, the failed
coup attempt strained US-Turkey relations further as Fethullah Gülen, believed
to be behind the attempt was residing in the USA. After 2016 Turkey’s foreign
policy tools changed drastically. ‘‘In terms of foreign policy tools, the AKP
government started to resort to military means, frequently using military
intervention, escalation, and gunboat diplomacy to achieve foreign policy
objectives’’ (Altunışık, 2022a: 171). The last military intervention that was
announced by President Erdoğan himself towards Syria in the late Spring of 2022
was stalled, despite several attempts to get a greenlight from Russia. So, Turkey
is using these tools with limited maneuvering capacity and with mixed results.
Turkey has been unable to change US policy on YPG. Turkey did manage to control
some areas in Syria and prevented full YPG control across the borderlands, and
allied partially with Russia and Iran, enough to give Turkey a say in the
future of Syria but not enough to change border crossings, YPG’s position or
its links with PKK.

            The
limits of these tools stem firstly from the failure of Turkey to play the
intended role of ‘peace maker’ in the region. Turkey had to face and is still
facing a Gulf region that acts increasingly more autonomous from global and
regional alliances. In fact, as Altunışık argues the region itself is becoming
more and more Gulf-centric (Altunışık 2022, this policy paper series), as the
Gulf countries act in unison in critical issues such as Syria. One of the
characteristics of this new order is containment of Iran and the second
characteristics may very well be containing the newly proactive Turkey. The
first front of that containment would be the consolidation of a new Syria.
Assad managed to get into collaborations with Gulf states and other Arab
states, most notably over the issue of gas and electricity. The new Biden
administration did not object to that collaboration, signaling what Steve Cook
calls ruthless pragmatism and continuation of the Trump
policy of minimal involvement in Syria, and the larger Middle East. In fact, as
of August 2022, the US presence in Syria is totaling to 900 officers. Even that
presence is causing friction, notably with the fourth state that shows presence
in Syria, Iran. Iranian forces retaliate against Israeli attacks by attacking
US base and personnel in Syria. US then responds by attacking Iran backed
militias in Syria.

So, the US policy in Syria is
consistent with a Great Power in rivalry with other Great Powers, most notably
China and is investing more attention in Asia. US still needs to protect Israel
to some degree, ensure the flow of oil and at least negotiate the price of oil.
US also still offers a security umbrella to the Gulf, although there are calls
from within US and within the Middle East for the Middle East to establish its
own security alliance in this new Gulf-centric regional order. That seems to be
another continuation from Trump to Biden administration and this perspective
would deprive Turkey from a regional middle power status even further. Turkey’s
attempts to have more military control over Syria should be read within this
context as well.

Syrian civil war challenged Turkey
on domestic, regional and global levels. There are security challenges against
Turkey arising from the war in Syria. There are also limits to the regional
support Turkey gathers that partially stem from the Syrian civil war. There are
also issues that relate to global positioning of Turkey that partially stem
from the Syrian civil war. This global re-positioning explains Turkey’s ease in
compartamentalizing its relations with Russia and Iran and aligning itself at
times with these two powers. Finally, there is a domestic political challenge
to Turkey’s regime that is further prolonged as the civil war itself is
prolonging. That is the challenge that is presented with the Syrian refugees in
Turkey and the issue of return that Turkish opposition voices as a strong
criticism towards President Erdoğan. The almost 4 million refugees, by their
sheer number and their various positioning within the Turkish domestic
political system, provide a fertile ground for opposing the newly transitioned
presidential system in Turkey. The opposition demands a decrease in the number
of refugees by returning them back to Syria, a demand problematic on moral,
logistical and political grounds. However, any resettlement would help the
current office holders in Turkey in their bid to win elections in 2023. The
rising nationalist sentiments in the general public and in Turkey’s opposition
parties amount to a nationalist turn. This of course also has a bearing on the
YPG issue and relations with the United States. 
Since nationalism is rarely contained within distinct issues and rising
sentiments against Syrians may spill over to increased nationalist discourse
towards the Kurds as well.

Currently, Turkey starts a
repositioning towards the Syrian regime, with talks of a future meeting with
Assad and potential acceptance of the durability of the Assad regime. Despite
the obstacles and red light from allies, Turkey still insists on a future
military intervention to the North. Regionally, Turkey softened its position
towards Israel and the GCC, attempting to gather a new regional momentum while
at least partially giving up its bid for regional middle power. US also
softened its position towards Saudi Arabia and continued Trump’s policies of
for negotiating for better relations between Israel and the Arab Middle East.
It also softened its economic pressure on Syria that had started with 2019
Caesar Act. It turns a blind eye to the Arab states re-engagement with Assad
regime. Iran and Turkey’s military presence will be controversial over the
coming months. Iran is already using that presence in Syria to engage in
clandestine conflicts with US forces to send a message to Israel.

Turkey-US bilateral relation may converge
throught this parallel softening towards the Assad regime and the domestic need
of both countries to not engage in lengthy military frictions in the region. As
US pays more attention to Asia and the rivalry with China, it needs the Syrian
civil war shortened and not prolonged. Turkey entering the election season,
also needs some settlement in Syria, especially to turn the refugee issue into
a less damaging one for the current office holders. The main divergence will
remain US-YPG relations which may change form if Assad regime consolidates
itself further and pushes Iran’s military presence somewhat to the fringes of
the civil war zones. If it does not change form, this issue will continue to be
a thorn in the bilateral relations, even in the case of electoral change in
Turkey, due to the nationalist streak rising in Turkish politics. Another
divergence in Syria may come from Turkey controlled zones and their future.
Turkey engages in construction projects in these zones, investing in multiple
ways to these territories. So, if the Gulf-centric order decides to contain
Turkey and Iran in Syria’s future rebuilding, and if US continues to support
that order as it seems to be doing at the moment, this containment of Turkey
may be another divergence in bilateral relations, originating in Syria.

Syria presents both points of
divergence and convergence for bilateral relations. The weight of the former
will be determined by the coming changes in domestic electoral politics in
Turkey as well as the pace and direction of the new regional order. The global
dimension of the Syrian civil war, with Russian and Iranian presence may be
affected by the changes in the regional order. Either way changes and
developments in the global dimension will be slower than the domestic and
regional levels.

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Altunışık, Meliha. ‘‘Change In
Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Global Shifts and Domestic Politics’’ in The Routledge
Handbook Of Diplomacy And Statecraft, ed. B.J.C. McKercher, London: Routledge,
2022.

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This paper is one of the outputs of the Opportunities for Shared Security Project, conducted by the Middle East Studies program at METU, supported by by the U.S. Embassy, Ankara, Grant No: STU15019612017.

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To cite this work: Derya Göçer , “ Us-Turkey Relations In The Context Of Syria: Crossroads For New Bilateral And Regional Alignments ”, Panaroma Analysis, 18 March 2023, https://www.uikpanorama.com/blog/2023/03/18/dg/

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