Turkey and the EU: Common Challenges and Shared Interests in a Conflict-Ridden World – Çiğdem Nas
Turkey-EU
relations have traditionally been characterized by fluctuations and cycles
by which it diverges and moves closer to the EU. Nevertheless, since the mid-2010s,
Turkey-EU relations deteriorated from a process of accession to a transactional
relationship and further towards an interest-driven and even adversarial one. The
revitalization of the relations upon the background of the Syrian refugee
crisis in 2015-16 could not be sustained in the medium term. The state of emergency
declared in the wake of the July 15 failed coup attempt and the transition to
the presidential regime in Turkey following the 2017 referendum triggered increasing
criticism from the EU and a widespread perception that Turkey was “moving
away from Europe”.
Turkey’s
backsliding regarding the political aspects of the Copenhagen Criteria was
coupled with multiplying disagreements on the foreign policy front. In 2019,
the EU adopted a series of sanctions against what it regarded as Turkey’s “illegal
drilling activities” in the Eastern Mediterranean. Efforts by some Member
States and the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy to prevent
further tension with Turkey led to the initiation of the “Positive
Agenda”, a framework for measures such as trade facilitation,
Customs Union modernization, high-level dialogues and people-to-people contacts
aiming to bring about renewed engagement between the parties. However, such efforts
had limited effects and failed to revitalize the Turkey-EU relationship towards
a more positive, trustful, and cooperative path.
Russia’s
assault on and invasion of Ukraine changed the underlying conditions of
European security and interstate relations. Considerations about the European
security order, defined by multidimensional security threats in the post-Cold
War World, focused on the need for the common defense against a fundamental
threat to the survival of an independent and sovereign country and its people
and hence a threat to the rules-based international system. Under these
extraordinary conditions, the collective defense commitment through NATO
assumed a critical relevance, and Ukraine, followed by Moldova and Georgia, applied
for EU membership, the second-best option to NATO membership. While this
process reignited the almost still EU enlargement, President Macron’s proposal
for a European Political Community (EPC) aimed to bring together countries of
the wider European geography, leaving out Russia and Belarus as a symbolic act
of defiance against aggression.
Turkey’s
position as a NATO member and an honest broker between Russia and Ukraine
became a critical factor in the changing European security landscape. Although
Turkey’s non-committal to the sanctions regime against Russia raised eyebrows
in both the US and the EU, there was also a considerable degree of
understanding displayed towards Turkey due to its geostrategic location
bordering Russia and Ukraine across the Black Sea, its support to Ukraine’s war
effort and its endeavor to mediate between the parties such as in the case of
the Grain Deal. Nevertheless, the EU noted its concerns about Turkey’s rising
trade with Russia since this may undermine
EU sanctions, especially regarding the free circulation of dual-use
goods by the Customs Union. Hence, an interest-only relationship based on
economic and trade priorities may hit the rocks due to political differences,
growing rift and mistrust, and inability to engage and cooperate.
Under
the prevailing circumstances, it stands to reason that the challenges from
rising adversity between Russia and the West, impending rivalry, and clash over
geopolitical interests between the US and China, and various types of
conventional, non-conventional, nuclear, and hybrid threats necessitate closer
coordination and cooperation between Turkey and the EU. After all, Turkey is a
NATO country, a candidate country to join the EU, and a Customs Union partner
of the Union. Turkey’s participation in the EPC Summit in Prague was significant
due to its inclusion in the anti-Russia front. However, its growing relations
with Russia can place Turkey-EU cooperation in danger and alter Turkey’s
foreign policy priorities and national interest calculations. Given the low
level of dialogue and engagement between Turkey and the EU, how can the parties
create the conditions conducive to further cooperation and coordination against
common threats?
Turkey
and the EU share many areas of interest, including but not limited to deterring
Russian aggression. In addition to increasing defense and security cooperation
both within NATO and regarding the EU security and defense policy and PESCO
framework, high-level dialogue meetings at the foreign ministers’ level and
regular Turkey-EU summits may be initiated. Turkey and EU cooperation may also
intensify in critical areas such as energy security, the fight against
disinformation, and green transformation. The launch of the Turkey Investment
Forum, aimed partly at sustaining Turkey’s alignment with the European Green
Deal, is a case in point. Turkey may also greatly aid the EU’s energy
transition efforts by its favorable disposition toward renewables and potential
to produce green
hydrogen.
Closer
cooperation and dialogue between Turkey and the EU may facilitate a paradigm
change in the Eastern Mediterranean from a region beset by conflict over
hydrocarbons to one exemplifying cooperation over renewables. However,
divergent positions on Cyprus and Greek-Turkish dispute over the Aegean stand
in the way of closer cooperation. It is possible to read expressions regarding
a staunch stance against Turkey’s position in various EU documents and Council
conclusions characterizing Turkey’s actions as illegal and against good
neighborly relations. In the recent regular report on Turkey, the European
Commission noted
that Turkey should respect the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of all Member States and take steps to fully respect international
law, de-escalate tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and promote good
neighborly relations.
Turkey
was also criticized for failing to comply with the EU’s foreign and security
policy statements with a “very
low alignment rate of 7 %”. Expecting Turkey’s alignment with EU common
policies and statements while keeping the accession process frozen is not an
effective strategy. Although Turkey is partly to blame for the failure of the
accession process due to its diversion from EU reforms, it was the EU that
suspended eight chapters in 2006 in connection with the Cyprus conflict and
then failed to open further chapters due to Member State vetoes. Therefore, a genuine
engagement and closer cooperation would depend upon a renewed effort to resolve
the Cyprus dispute and further engagement between Greece and Turkey over
bilateral issues. Without the Cyprus problem out of the way, it will be
difficult for the EU and Turkey to cooperate on security issues, intensify
bilateral relations, step up Turkey’s integration into the Single Market and
improve their cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The
accession prospect still seems to be the most effective framework for
regulating Turkey-EU relations and integrating Turkey further into the European
security order, although it is not the most plausible under the current EU
approach.
Cigdem Nas is the Secretary-General of the Economic Development Foundation (IKV), an NGO specialized on Turkey-EU relations. She is also an associate professor of international relations and a member of staff at the Department of Political Science and International Relations of the Yildiz Technical University in Istanbul. She graduated from the Political Sicence Department of Bosphorous University in 1988, completed her Masters on European Social Policy at the London School of Economics and Political Science and her Doctorate athe Marmara University EU Institute on the minority rights regime in Europe in 2000. She worked as a researcher at the Istanbul Chamber of Industry between 1992-94, then joined the EU Institute of the Marmara University as a research assistant. She became an associate professor in 2007 and transferred to the Yildiz Technical University. She is the author or several books and articles on the EU and Turkey-EU relations including Turkey and the EU: Processes of Europeanization ve Turkey and EU Integration: Achievements and Obstacles published by Routledge. She is a member of the Turkish University Studies Association on EU Studies (TUNAECS), Academic Network of European Studies in Turkey (A-NEST), the Europe Team of the Delegation of the EU in Ankara, Jean Monnet Scholars Association, Global Relations Forum, and International Political Science Association (IPSA).
To cite this work: Çiğdem Nas, “Turkey and the EU: Common Challenges and Shared Interests in a Conflict-Ridden World”, Panorama, Online, 26 March 2023, https://www.uikpanorama.com/blog/2023/03/26/cn
This article has been prepared with the support provided to the International Relations Council and the Global Academy by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung Association Turkey Representative within the scope of the project titled ‘Foreign Policy for the 21st Century; Peaceful, Equitable, and Dynamic Turkey’.
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